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In the current “Brexit” crisis, the EU should strive to achieve a smooth agreement-
based process. This is the only way to ensure that the intricate web binding the UK
to the EU is not ripped up without  a reliable  substitute. Boris Johnson’s priority to
withdraw the UK on 31 October "do or die“ is next to impossible to reconcile with that
aim: it is unlikely that the UK Parliament were to accept Theresa May’s deal which
it rejected thrice.  So far, the Prime Minister has conjured some principles, which
might grow into a a  draft withdrawal agreement before the next European Council
summit on 16-17 October. Even if this were agreed, only 14 days remain until 31
October for the European Parliament to approve, and the two Houses of Parliament
in Westminster to endorse its ratification. Under Article 13 of the EU Withdrawal Act
2018, as amended by the “Benn Act” (below), without ratification  an unmanaged
“Brexit” would ensue. 
Domestically, it will be difficult to halt Johnson’s no-deal plan, as I will show in more
detail below. But what about the EU? Indeed, there are several measures the EU
could take to deal with a rogue UK Prime Minister and to make a smooth withdrawal
more likely.
Preventing “no deal” within the UK: The “Benn Act”
as a barrier? 
The so-called “Benn Act”, crafted as a barrier against a “no-deal Brexit”, requires
specified action by the Prime Minister, if there is no a withdrawal agreement by 19
October, or, alternatively, Parliament has accepted a motion that the UK withdraws
from the EU in a disorderly fashion on 31 October. If neither happens, the PM must
send a letter to the European Council requesting an extension of the negotiation
period under Article 50 TEU until end of January 2020. If the European Council
grants the request, the Prime Minister is also required to accept this, even with  a
different end date. Should the Prime Minister send a second letter asking for the first
one not to be taken seriously, this would still violate the legislation, which requires
the PM to seriously seek an extension. Some speculate that the government will
ask the Privy Council to postpone the Act’s implementation until after 31 October,
possibly relying on the Civil Contingency Act 2004. The CCA allows a government to
refrain from enacting legislation in a national emergency. The government plans to
rely on the argument that riots will ensue if the UK is not withdrawn from the EU by
31 October. However,  the CCA’s definition of an emergency can hardly be stretched
to include hostile public opinion whipped up by governments or their advisors. 
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The government does not need to use such dubious measures in order to thwart
the “Benn Act”. After all, the Act says nothing about a conditional acceptance of the
extension by the EU, as has been proposed by the European Parliament (EP) last
week. So, if the acceptance by the EU comes with conditions attached, formally,
the prime minister may still reject it without parliamentary consent. Finally, section 3
(3) of the “Benn Act” allows for the government to put a motion before Parliament,
asking whether the extension should be accepted, instead of using its prerogative
to just accept it. If Parliament rejects the extension, the government may reject it as
well. Seeking a specific decision by Parliament should also be the adequate route to
deal with any conditions for the extension. 
The Prime Minister might seek a further prorogation of parliament in spite of the
Supreme Court ruling of 24 September. But there is also a procrastination strategy
available which remains safely within the law. First, he can prevent the EU Council
on 14-16 October from even discussing a changed withdrawal agreement by
refusing to provide any document detailing changes which the European Council
could forward to the 28 Member States’ governments for inspection at least two
weeks before the meeting. Second, he could then table the 2018 draft withdrawal
agreement in the House of Commons. If it fails a fourth time, he can deal with the
ensuing obligation under the Benn-Act as indicated above. Even if the House passes
the withdrawal agreement, the timing to pass legislation to ratify it, as previously
discussed, is very short. Some administrative manoeuvring would easily achieve no-
deal Brexit. 
Any parliamentary vote capable of preventing no deal Brexit is likely to take place
just a few days before 31 October. The weeks in the runup to that vote there is time
to intensify the hostile rhetoric peddled by the current government. Any MP voting for
an extension may be branded a traitor, and the Prime Minister himself may continue
to explain that MP’s only protection against violence consists of them voting with the
government. If these techniques are paired with threats from outside government
and parliament, the MPs’ resolve to prevent no-deal “Brexit” may waver. 
Gaining the upper hand for the EU? 
What, if anything, can the EU do to avoid a no-deal Brexit under these
circumstances? The inflammatory rhetoric and the explicit intention to dodge their
legal obligations resemble debates in other Member States where democracy is
threatened by right wing populism. Dealing with a rogue UK Prime Minister thus
offers another opportunity to the EU to demonstrate that its defence of its values is
robust. 
In the first instance, the EU could take hold of the reins through the European
Council initiating an extension of the withdrawal period, rather than waiting for an
application by the UK , in line with the wording of Article 50 paragraph 2:
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the (withdrawing state) from the date
of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years
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after the notification (….) unless the European Council, in agreement with
the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”
If the European Council were to be proactive, it could also phrase its conditions
more clearly and tie the extension to holding either a general election or a renewed
referendum which is untainted by fraudulent campaigning strategies. This would
support those UK MPs who are reluctant to agree to any action other than requiring
Boris Johnson to resign, because this would lead to an unmanaged withdrawal. It
would also support democratic processes, as it is virtually impossible to organise an
election before 31 October 2019. 
If the European Council were to propose the extension, this would relieve Boris
Johnson from the task to deliver a prefabricated letter. It would be difficult for the
UK government to reject such a proposal, if it has not provided sufficiently sincere,
and elaborated e proposals for changing  the draft withdrawal agreement. This might
even seem to be in contrast if not with the letter, then the spirit of the “Benn Act”. If
the UK Parliament is not prorogued again, it will probably  adopt at least a motion, if
not legislation to endorse the extension. 
There is a downside from the EU perspective: the UK would continue to participate
in the EU political processes. For this reason, the last extension was set for
the 31 October, the last day of office of the present EU Commission. As an EU
Member State, the UK has ample opportunities to thwart EU governance, for
example by refusing to accept the budget for 2020. Earlier this month, Johnson had
threatened to make the EUs operation illegal, for example by refusing to nominate a
Commissioner. However, this move would only constitute a breach of EU duties by
the UK, which could be addressed by the usual EU procedures, i.e. litigation before
the ECJ. 
Once the negotiation period is extended, the EU might also wish to propose on its
own account changes to the draft withdrawal agreement, in particular its Protocol
on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The original sketch was based on the assumption
that Northern Ireland would be in a common regulatory area with the EU, and
also contained a draft provision which would have allowed to extend this common
regulatory area to encompass the full Internal Market. The intervention by the UK
resulted in a construction according to which the UK remains in a customs union
with the EU, hindering its aspirations to conclude free trade agreements all over the
world. This is however problematic for the EU as well. The EU Commission could
utilise the break produced by the UK government’s inaction re negotiation in order to
fully paraphrase its original proposal, thus potentially closing in on agreement. 
Rule-of-law proceedings against the still-Member
State UK 
The menacing rhetoric of the present government, often uttered in the heat of the
moment, may be indicative of a more serious problem within the still-Member State
UK. In the last few days, members of her Majesty’s government and their advisors
have openly hinted at the use of rioting and violence should the country not withdraw
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from the EU on 31 October. This may indicate a reluctance to accept the results of
the democratic process in the country, such as the Benn Act. The rhetoric of a Prime
Minister referring to an act of parliament as a surrender act may further support the
assumption that this Prime Minister is unwilling to accept decisions by parliament. If
strategies as outlined above, aimed to avoid compliance with an act of parliament,
will actually be implemented, the problem would become even more serious. If the
Prime Minister were not to comply with elements of the recent Supreme Court ruling,
even the rule of law in the UK might be in danger. 
If democracy or the rule of law are no longer adhered to in a Member State, there
may be a breach of the EU’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Under Article 7 TEU,
the Council may determine a risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values (paragraph
1), and with more stages to be completed, even find a serious breach (paragraph
2). This can then lead to a suspension of membership rights. Paragraphs 3-5). The
threshold for applying this provision is very high: Already for establishing the risk
of a breach under paragraph one, the Council cannot act on its own initiative. A
reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, the European Parliament or
the EU Commission is required, and the Council needs to decide with four fifth of
its members and the consent of the European Parliament. In order to establish a
serious breach, unanimity of all Council members (excepting the Member State in
question) is needed. The provision, also termed the “nuclear option”, is criticised
for being designed in a way that prevents its use. However, this was also thought
to be the case with Article 50 TEU, which is presently used. The Commission has
further developed a complementing “rule of law framework”, providing mechanisms
for low level intervention. A proposal for a regulation aiming to limit access to the
EU’s structural funds to rule of law violations has not passed all the stages of the
parliamentary process before the EP elections in May 2019. 
Notwithstanding widespread critique, the existence of this framework demonstrates
that the EU is not fully unprepared to deal with a rogue government in one of its
Member States. Accordingly, Members of the European Parliament have already
proposed to explore whether the situation in the United Kingdom has developed in
such ways that a rule of law investigation is necessary. This proposal was triggered
by the long prorogation of parliament. The Supreme Court’s ruling of 24 September
has demonstrated, that there was no need of external control, since the UK’s
judiciary has reined in the government. However, should the political dynamics result
in more sustained threats of violence as a means of politics, the EU would not be
without means to rein in its still-member UK. Such an event would offer a further
opportunity to test the strength and functionality of the rule-of-law framework. 
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